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CASE NOTES
Environmental Law—Water Pollution Remedies—Use of Public
Nuisance Theory in Suit by Federal Government—United States v.
Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc.'--The United States sought permanent in-
junctive relief in the Federal District Court for the District of
Vermont to prevent defendant corporations from conducting their oil
transport, unloading and storage businesses without complying with
certain safety procedures 2 designed to minimize the danger of future
oil spills and leakages. The defendants were a New York corporation
(Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc.) and a Vermont corporation (Northern
Oil Co., Inc.), whose subsidiaries supplied water transportation ser-
vices and operated an oil dolphin (an offshore wharf with a pipeline
connection to shore) in a Vermont harbor?' The Government's com-
plaint referred to section 407 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropria-
tion Act of 1899; 4 section 407 is popularly known as the Refuse Act.
The complaint charged that on seven different occasions from April
1967 through June 1971, oil being transported by defendant Bushey's
vessels was spilled into Lake Champlain in violation of the Refuse
Act.5 The complaint alleged that the spills of petroleum products,
which varied in quantity from twenty to twenty-five thousand gallons,
were caused by vessels running aground, leaks during unloading opera-
1 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972).
2 Id. at 147-48 n.2. The procedures would require defendants to display lights on all
vessels carrying cargoes of oil during darkness; to operate all tugboats with pilots having
pilots licenses and engineers with engineers licenses from the U.S. Coast Guard; to have
tugboat engineers undergo annual physical examinations including hearing tests; to furnish
all tugboats with operational searchlights; to provide operational radar on all tugboats
during periods of darkness or reduced visibility; to compel tugboat crew members to
refrain from the consumption of alcoholic beverages for a period of at least four hours
prior to reporting for duty; to operate all tugboats with engine controls in their pilot
houses; to operate all vessels at reasonable speeds and less than five miles per hour
within harbor areas; and to develop contingency plans relating to the clean-up and
prevention of oil discharges subject to the approval of the Environmental Protection
Agency. The complaint also asked for any other relief the court deemed necessary and
proper. Id.
a Id. at 146 n.l.
4 33 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970). Section 407 provides:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or
procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship,
barge, or other floating craft of any kind, . any refuse matter of any kind
or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and
passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United
States, or into any tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall
float or be washed into such navigable water; and it shall not be lawful to
deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be deposited material of any kind on the
bank of any navigable water, or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable
water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water,
either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby
navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed ... .
2 346 F. Supp. at 146.
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tions, and, in one instance, by a crack in the hull of a vessel .° Defen-
dants moved for dismissal on the grounds that the complaint failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted? The defendants ar-
gued, first, that injunctive relief was inappropriate because section 411,
the remedial provision of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899 [1899 Act],s did not provide for this remedy.° The defendants
further argued that issuance of injunctive relief would violate the
doctrine of separation of powers and would have the effect of dis-
criminating against the defendants. 1° Finally, the defendants argued
that the plaintiff had adequate remedies at law and therefore that
injunctive relief was inappropriate.'
The court rejected all three of the defendants' arguments and
denied the motion to dismiss. 12 Rather than attempting to find au-
6 Id. at 146-47 n.1.
7 Id. at 148.
8 33 U.S.C. 411 (1970). That section provides:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate . . . the provisions
of sections 407, 408, and 409 of this title shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and
on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500 nor less
than $500, or by imprisonment (in the case of a natural person) for not less
than thirty days nor more than one year, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment, in the discretion of the court . . • .
9 346 F. Supp. at 148. Defendants attempted to distinguish their case from the
prior cases of Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967), and
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960), in which relief not ex-
plicitly provided by the 1899 Act was nevertheless "inferred" to be appropriate. See
text at notes 59-62 infra. Unlike the earlier cases, defendants claimed that the of-
fending conduct in Bushey (the oil spills) had ceased and that the resultant harm (the
oil slicks) did not remain.
10 In support of this claim, defendants contended that the court would in effect
be promulgating regulations beyond existing requirements passed by Congress, and in
so doing would be usurping legislative power. 346 F. Supp. at 148. Defendants also
noted that the relief sought by plaintiff would have the result of creating operations re-
quirements applicable to only one navigable waterway user, the defendant, and would
thus be discriminatory. Id.
11
 The remedies at law alleged by the defendants to be adequate included the
fines provided in 411 of the 1899 Act, as well as the rule-making procedures of ad-
ministrative agencies charged with oil spill control. Id.
12 Id. at 151. The court did not consider the defendants' first argument—that the
1899 Act did not provide for injunctive relief—since it found independent grounds upon
which relief could be granted. See text at notes 13-16 infra.
Defendants' second ground for the motion to dismiss—that the court's granting
relief would violate the doctrine of separation of powers and would be discriminatory—
was also rejected, the court replying briefly, "[A]ny framing of equitable relief against
the defendant in an otherwise constitutionally permissible case or controversy clearly
does not amount to usurpation of the legislative power or improper 'discrimination'
against the losing party." Id. at 150.
In disposing of defendants' last contention—that the remedies at law were adequate
—the court first reiterated its decision that the remedies provided by the 1899 Act and
the FWPCA are not exclusive. Id, The court then added that it found unavailing
defendants' claim that administrative agency rule-making procedures were adequate
legal remedies, stating that "the .contingency of third party remedial action will not
foreclose a properly instituted nuisance suit." Id. The court also stated that the ques-
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thority in the 1899 Act for injunctive relief, the court found inde-
pendent grounds upon which relief could be granted." The court
HELD: In a suit brought by the federal government, a complaint
alleging pollution in violation of the Refuse Act states a claim upon
which relief may be granted under the federal common law of public
nuisance and that injunctive relief may be appropriate under that
doctrine." The Bushey court based its holding on the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee," which, it observed,
revived "poor old" public nuisance as a viable legal justification for
issuing injunctive relief against pollution of interstate or navigable
waters, despite the legislative enactments on the subject," the 1899
Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [FWPCA]."
The noteworthy aspect of Bushey is its extension of Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee—in which the Supreme Court declared that a
plaintiff state may validly utilize the public nuisance doctrine in a pol-
lution action in order to obtain federal district court jurisdiction—to
actions brought by the federal government in quest of injunctive re-
lief. In City of Milwaukee, the Supreme Court observed that the
plaintiff state had no express statutory remedy available to it," and
found that the remedies for water pollution provided by the 1899
Act and the FWPCA are not exclusive in such a case." Hence the
Court held that a federal common law action based on public nuisance
could be maintained by the plaintiff state." In contrast, Bushey al-
lowed the federal government to use the public nuisance doctrine as
a means of recovery despite the existence of explicit remedies provided
by legislation."
tion of adequate remedies at law is one that must be considered only after the merits
of the case are heard. Id.
18 Id. at 14S-49.
14 Id. at 148.
15 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
10 346 F. Supp. at 149-50.
17 33 U.S.C. if§ 1151 et seq. (1970). Subsequent to the Bushey decision, the FWPCA
was amended by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-500 (codified, with minor exceptions, at 33 U.S.C.A. HI 1251 at seq. (Supp.
1973)). For a commentary on these amendments, see Comment, The Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 672 (1973). Here-
inafter, only the former version of the FWPCA, referred to in the Bushey opinion, will
be cited, unless explicit reference is made Lto the 1972 Amendments.
18
 406 U.S. at 103.
19 Id.
28 Id. at 99, 107.
21 It should again be noted that although the plaintiff federal government
pleaded violations of the 1899 Act, the court determined that the cause of action was
grounded in the federal common law of public nuisance, and that the use of public
nuisance was not inconsistent with the 1899 Act, the FWPCA, or any other legislation
in force at the time. See text at notes 13-17 supra.
In extending the City of Milwaukee determination that neither the FWPCA nor
any other existing legislation (including, of course, the 1899 Act) precluded the use of
public nuisance, it is not clear whether, the court in Bushey considered the explicit
remedies provided for the federal government by the FWPCA. The FWPCA provides:
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Bushey has obvious desirable implications for environmental pro-
tection. The decision suggests that the power of the federal govern-
ment to enjoin pollution is not limited to specific remedial provisions
provided by Congress. This rationale could arguably be carried be-
yond interstate water pollution to air and noise pollution. State en-
vironmental enforcement agencies may also avail themselves of the
public nuisance approach suggested by Bushey where state remedial
legislation falls short of adequate protection.
This note will evaluate the suggestion, made by the court in
Bushey in denying defendants' motion to dismiss, that common law
public nuisance retains its validity in the environmental control con-
text. Specifically, it will briefly trace the background of public nui-
sance, examining its traditional scope and problems associated with
its use. The history of the protection of interstate and navigable wa-
ters will then be explored, noting the use of public nuisance to protect
these waters. This historical treatment will culminate in a discussion
of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee and the unique problems which
spawned that decision. The note will then consider and evaluate the
discussion of the doctrine of public nuisance by the court in Bushey
in its denial of defendants' motion to dismiss. Finally, an attempt
will be made to resolve the issues raised in Bushey by suggesting an
alternative ground for the decision, predicated on the conclusion that
the public nuisance doctrine was misused in Bushey.
An examination of the background of the public nuisance con-
cept shows that it has been given a broad definition at common law:
[A] public nuisance has been defined as "a violation of a
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local government, when
the President determines there is an imminent and substantial threat to the public
health or welfare of the United States, including, but not limited to, fish, shell-
fish, and wildlife and public and private property, shorelines, and beaches
within the United States, because of an actual or threatened discharge of oil
into or upon the navigable waters of the United States from an onshore or off-
shore [oil] facility, the President may require the United States attorney of
the district in which the threat occurs to secure such relief as may be necessary
to abate such threat, and the district courts of the United States shall have
jurisdiction to grant such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case
may require.
33 U.S.C. § 1161(e) (1970). Though the Bushey court referred to the FWPCA gen-
erally, 346 F. Supp. at 149 n.8, 150, the court stated that "[i]n the Illinois [v. City of
Milwaukee] case, as here, '[t]he remedy sought by [plaintiff] is not within the precise
scope of remedies prescribed by Congress . '" Id. at 149 (footnotes omitted). In
addition, the Bushey court summarized, without reference to 1161(e) of the FWPCA,
that "[t]hus, defendants' first two arguments on their motion to dismiss fail, for the
Rivers and Harbors Act does not foreclose a public nuisance action . . . ." Id. at 150
(emphasis added). Whether or not the Bushey court was aware of § 1161(e) of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the fact remains that the court allowed, and, in
fact, introduced the possibility of, the use of the common law public nuisance doctrine,
despite the presence of explicit statutory remedies. The court thus suggested that the
federal government is not bound by explicit remedies provided by statute to combat water
pollution.
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public right, either by a direct encroachment upon public
rights or property, or by doing some act which tends to a
common injury, or by omitting to do some act which the com-
mon good requires, and which it is the duty of the person to
do, and the omission to do which results injuriously to the
public."22
In addition, statutes have occasionally adopted general language simi-
lar to that of the common law in defining public nuisance," or have
specified certain kinds of conduct to be public nuisances. 24 The con-
cept has been used in a variety of situations in which public rights
have been infringed. Interferences with the public right of passage
on a public highway have been classified public nuisances," as have
interferences with the use of public places and public property," in-
terferences with navigation, 27 public health," public safety," public
morals," public peace," and public comfort. 82 Thus, historically, the
scope of public nuisance has been broad, including within its purview
a wide variety of conduct.
Despite the potential scope of public nuisance, its application has
22 Chicago v. Shaynin, 258 III. 69, 71, 101 N.E. 224, 225 (1913) (footnote omitted).
Other courts have adopted a similar definition. See, e.g., Nuchols v. Commonwealth, 312
Ky. 171, 173, 226 S.W.2d 796, 798 (1950); Commonwealth v. South Covington &
Cincinnati St. Ry., 181 Ky. 459, 463, 205 S.W. 581, 583 (1918); State v. Turner, 198
S.C. 487, 495-96, 18 S.E.2d 372, 375 (1942).
23 See, e.g., Ariz, Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-601 (1956).
24 See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1001/2, § 26 (Sup)). 1972).
25 See, e.g., Town of Newcastle v. Grubbs, 171 Ind. 482, 86 N.E. 757 (1908) (an
excavation); Leahan v. Cochran, 178 Mass. 566, 60 N.E. 382 (1901) (ice on a side-
walk); Salsbury v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 203 Misc. 1008, 120 N.Y.S.2d 33 (N.Y.C.
Mun. Ct. 1953) (double parking).
26 See, e.g., Adams v. Commissioners of Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 102 A.2d 830 (1954)
(encroachment); Watertown v. Cowen, 4 Paige 510 (N.Y. Ch. 1834) (building ob-
structing public square).
27 See, e.g., Tuell v, Inhabitants of Marion, 110 Me. 460, 86 A. 980 (1913) (bridge
obstructing navigation on a stream); Gates v. Northern Pac. R.R., 64 Wis. 64, 24 N.W.
494 (1885) (failure to open drawbridge which obstructed navigation).
28 See, e.g., Durand v. Dyson, 271 Ill. 382, 111 N.E. 143 (1915) (keeping dis-
eased animals); City of Ludlow v. Commonwealth, 247 Ky. 166, 56 S.W.2d 958 (1933)
(defective sewers); Attorney General v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct, 133 Mass. 361 (1882)
(lowering the water level of a pond); State ex rel. Marron v. Compere, 44 N.M. 414,
103 P.2d 273 (1940) (incompetent practice of medicine).
22 See, e.g., Liber v. Flor, 160 Colo. 7, 415 P.2d 332 (1966) (explosives stored near
highway); Yackel v. Nys, 258 App. Div. 318, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 545 (1939) (vicious dog).
50 See, e.g., Engle v. State, 53 Ariz. 458, 90 P.2d 988 (1939) (gaming); Nuchols
v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 171, 226 S.W.2d 796 (1950) (indecent exposure).
21 See, e.g., McMillan v. Kuehnle, 76 N.J. Eq. 256, 73 A. 1054 (1909) (Sunday
baseball); State v. Turner, 198 S.C. 487, 18 S.E.2d 372 (1942) (noisy, rowdy dance
hall).
32 See, e.g., Potashnick Truck Serv., Inc., v. City of Sikeston, 351 Mo. 505, 173
S.W.2d 96 (1943) (odors); Karpisek v. Cather & Sons Constr., Inc., 174 Neb. 234, 117
N.W.2d 322 (1962) (dust). For a more complete listing of conduct which has been
held to constitute a public nuisance, see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts §
821B, at 22-24 (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
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been limited under several circumstances. One of these circumstances
arises when the public nuisance doctrine is sought to be used to ob-
tain injunctive relief against conduct which has been defined by stat-
ute as criminal. Where a government entity seeks injunctive relief
against any conduct made criminal by statute, courts of equity tra-
ditionally will not grant relief. The reason for this refusal is that
contempt of court sanctions to enforce injunctions substitute judicial
penalties for those imposed by the legislature, violating the separa-
tion of powers doctrine." Also, problems arise concerning the in-
fringement of defendants' constitutional rights in criminal proceedings,
such as the right to trial by jury."
For the reasons noted above, injunctive relief will not normally
be granted where criminal activity constitutes a public nuisance."
However, where a criminal activity is found to constitute a public
nuisance and to pose a threat of harm to a public right which is in-
adequately protected by the criminal sanctions, courts will grant in-
junctive relief.86 Thus, though public nuisance is normally limited
when its use is sought to enjoin conduct which is criminal, in those
situations where the criminal sanctions inadequately protect the public 
88
 Commonwealth v. Stratton Finance Co., 310 Mass. 469, 474, 38 N.E.2d 640, 643
(1941).
84 See, e.g., State v. Vaughan, 81 Ark. 117, 127, 98 S.W. 685, 690 (1906), People v.
Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 880, 118 P.2d 472, 476 (1941); F. McClintock, McClintock on
Equity § 164, at 448 (2d ed. 1948).
85 Whether injunctive relief will be granted to enjoin criminal activity as a public
nuisance depends on how public nuisance is defined. If public nuisance is defined as an
interference with the rights of the public, then all such public nuisances may be en-
joined regardless of whether the conduct is criminal. Caldwell, Injunctions Against
Crime, 26 Ill. L. Rev. 259, 268 (1931), If, however, public nuisance is defined other-
wise, as, for example, a repeated violation of a statute, injunctive relief will not be
granted unless the conduct threatens some public rights. Id. Because public nuisance is
defined in such varying manners among different jurisdictions, it is important to note
that threatened harm to the public's rights, not the term "public nuisance," is the critical
factor in determining whether criminal conduct should be enjoined. Id. at 269.
813
 Injunctions have been issued to protect the public from harm resulting from
criminal activity in a variety of situations. In order to protect the public welfare, the
practice of usury has been enjoined. See, e.g., State ex rel. Burgum v. Hooker, 87
N.W.2d 337, 343 (N.D. 1957). Contra, Commonwealth v. Stratton Finance Co., 310
Mass. 469, 474-75, 38 N.E.2d 640, 643-44 (1941). In State v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 147
Neb. 970, 978, 25 N.W.2d 824, 829 (1947), considerations of public safety led the
court to enjoin the railroad from using light reflectors In place of safety lights which
were required by a statute that also carried criminal penalties for violations. Due to
harm threatened to the public health, the court in City of Chicago v. Fritz, 36 III. App.
2d 457, 466-67, 184 N.E.2d 713, 717 (1962) enjoined the operation of a dump, despite
applicable criminal penalties. Similarly, striking mine workers who blocked the only
street leading to the mine were enjoined from interfering with the public's right to
travel freely on public highways, despite their potential criminal liability, in State ex
rel. Allai v. Thatch, 361 Mo. 190, 198, 234 S.W.2d 1, 7 (1950). Finally, injunctive
relief has been issued to protect public property, despite criminal sanctions for the
offensive conduct. In Clark v. Todd, 192 Md. 487, 492, 64. A.2d 547, 549 (1949), an
injunction was issued restraining the defendants from dredging for oysters with boats
greater than the maximum allowed by a statute which also provided criminal penalties
for its violation. See generally Caldwell, supra note 35, at 274.
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from harm, public nuisance may be used despite historical limitations
on allowing injunctive relief against criminal activities.
The notable decision of the United States Supreme Court in In
re Debs" presented a discussion of the use of injunctions by the
federal government to restrain criminal activity. In Debs, a labor
union leader, held in contempt of court and jailed for failing to obey
an injunction ordering the cessation of a crippling nationwide strike
and associated criminal acts of violence and destruction, appealed to
the Court for a writ of habeas corpus." The writ was denied and the
injunction upheld, the Court finding that the rail stoppage injured
the public, throwing interstate commerce into a state of "general
confusion."'" Analogizing to public nuisance cases, the Court decided
that injunctive relief was appropriate to prevent "great public in-
jury." 4° Further, the Court found that even though the members of
the appellant's union might have been subject to criminal liability
for their conduct, injunctive relief ordering the union from further
hindering the railroad's operation was appropriately issued to protect
the public from the harm resulting from the obstruction of interstate
commerce.4' Thus, in the Debs case, by analogizing to the public
nuisance concept and addressing itself in general to the appropriate-
ness of granting the Government injunctive relief, the Supreme Court
prescribed the boundaries of governmental use of the public nuisance
doctrine to seek injunctive relief against criminal activity. Since the
Debs decision, injunctive relief has been granted in a number of situa-
tions to protect the public from various harms resulting from criminal
activity."
The potential scope of the public nuisance doctrine has histori-
cally been subject to a second limitation. The continued viability of
public nuisance as a justification for seeking relief is called into ques-
tion when legislation is enacted which provides civil remedies but
does not explicitly repeal the existing common law. In dealing with
other common law issues, courts have held that the common law is
not implicitly repealed by legislation." On the other hand, where the
common law has been found to contradict the policy of recent enact-
87 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
38 Id. at 570-73. The acts sought to be enjoined were acts of destruction of rail-
road property and violence against personnel who did not participate in the strike. These
acts involved potential criminal liability, Id. at 568-69, 594, 599.
30 Id. at 592.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 593-94.
42 See note 36 supra.
48 See, e.g., Shaw v. Armour & Co., 175 F. Supp. 213, 214 (N.D. Fla. 1959), where
it was held that under Florida law a manufacturer's common law liability for conse-
quential damages was not limited by an act which detailed procedures for refunds for
the purchase price of faulty products; see also Ruby Lumber Co. v. Johnson Co., 299
Ky. 811, 818-21, 187 S.W.2d 449, 452-53 (1945), where the court declared that a sub-
contractor's common law right to indemnification for the amount of payments to an
injured employee was not impaired by the enactment of a workman's compensation act.
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ments, courts have opted against the common law principle." Thus,
the common law doctrine of public nuisance would retain its vitality
in spite of legislative enactments providing governments with civil
remedies, so long as the use of the public nuisance cause of action
does not conflict with an underlying policy of that legislation. 45
A review of the history of the protection of public rights in in-
terstate waters reveals that public nuisance has had only a limited
application. The concept fell into disuse with the enactment of legis-
lation to remedy water pollution, and has only recently been revived
in the City of Milwaukee and Bushey cases. In an 1851 decision,
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co.," the Supreme Court held that
a bridge obstructing navigation on an interstate waterway was a
public nuisance, and ordered either its structural modification so as
to permit unimpeded navigation or its removal 47 Noting an absence
of federal legislation in point, and an early decision ruling that there
is no common law of the United States," the Court found authority to
act in what it referred to as the "common law of chancery."'" Ap-
proving the proposition that the Supreme Court sitting in equity has
jurisdiction wherever the High Court of Chancery of England had
jurisdiction, the Court found authority to act against the bridge as
a public nuisance, obstructing navigation on an interstate waterway. 5°
Subsequently, in Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch"' the Court
limited the Wheeling Bridge decision to interstate waters. The Court
there held that the interference with navigation on a navigable water-
way entirely within a state was not a matter of federal concern, ab-
sent an expression of Congress to the contrary. 52 Three years after
the Willamette decision, Congress made all interferences with naviga-
tion a matter of federal concern by enacting the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1890: 68 This legislation was rewritten in a more comprehen-
44 See, e.g., United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1958),
where the policy of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1935, ch. 498, 49 Stat. 543 (codified
in scattered sections of 15, 49 U.S.C.), was successfully argued to overcome the common
law rule that partnerships are not legal entities capable of being sued; United States v.
General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 955, 960-61 (E.D.N.Y.
1972), where the policy of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, 80
Stat. 1125 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 28, 40 U.S.C.), has been held to change
the common law rule of "first in time, first in right."
45 Cf. Ohio River Sand Co. v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Ky. 1971),
where the court found that the common law public nuisance doctrine retained its
vitality despite the enactment of state pollution control legislation. The legislation there
contained a "saving clause" which provided that the enactment was to supplement rather
than repeal existing law.
48 54 U.S. (13 How.) 556 (1851) .
47 Id. at 668-70.
48 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 374, 418-19 (1834).
45 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 603.
50
 Id. at 604.
51
 125 U.S. 1 (1887).
82 Id. at 16-17.
53 Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426.
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sive package in 1899 and became the Rivers and Harbors Appropria-
tion Act of 1899." The 1899 Act provides for fines and imprisonment"
for violations. In addition, in limited circumstances—to remove struc-
tures erected in violation of the Act—injunctive relief is provided."
Thereafter, with the availability of these statutory remedies, use of
public nuisance to protect public rights in interstate waters waned.
However, despite the virtual retirement of the public nuisance
doctrine, injunctive relief remained available. Even though the 1899
Act, which displaced the public nuisance doctrine as the basis for a
cause of action in water pollution cases, provided expressly for penal
sanctions against violators and failed to provide for general injunc-
tive relief, the courts continued to grant injunctive relief on the theory
that such relief was impliedly authorized by the Act. In Sanitary
District of Chicago v. United States," the Supreme Court upheld the
granting of an injunction preventing defendants from removing more
than a specified amount of water daily from Lake Michigan. The
Court said nothing about public nuisance, but based its decision on
the belief that the policy of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899—the
continued unimpairment of navigation of navigable waterways—pro-
vided authority for issuing such relief." More recently, in United
States v. Republic Steel Corp.," the Court again found injunctive
relief to be impliedly authorized by the 1899 Act. In Republic Steel,
the Court upheld the granting of injunctions ordering the cessation
of discharges and the removal from a navigable river of sedimentary
deposits caused by the defendant." Similarly, in Wyandotte Trans-
portation Co. v. United States,' an order compelling reimbursement
for the cost to the United States of removing a sunken vessel from a
navigable channel and a declaration of responsibility for the removal
of another sunken vessel were held by the Supreme Court to be ap-
propriate enforcement measures under the 1899 Act.°2 In short, even
though the use of the common law public nuisance concept may have
been appropriate in Republic Steel and Wyandotte Transportation,
the Court based its decision on the quite different rationale of imply-
ing remedies from the statutory policy.
Although the use of public nuisance and the implication, from
a statutory policy, of authority to grant relief beyond statutory rem-
edies produce the same result, they differ in two ways. First, the
mechanism of implied authority avoids the problem of conflict with
criminal and civil remedial statutes which accompany the use of public
54 33 U.S.C. §* 401 et seq. (1970).
00 33 U.S.C. §§ 406, 411 (1970),
50 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1970).
57 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
58 Id. at 429.
59 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
00 Id. at 491-92.
01 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
62 Id. at 200-10.
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nuisance. Second, the rationales underlying the two concepts are quite
different. Public nuisance looks to some substantial and inadequately
protected public harm. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in
Republic Steel, described the different rationale for implying authority
to grant injunctive relief from statutory policy:
The void which was left by Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v.
Hatch, . . . need not be filled by detailed codes which pro-
vided for every contingency. Congress has legislated and
made its purpose clear; it has provided enough federal law
in § 10 [of the 1899 Act, codified at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970)1
from which appropriate remedies may be fashioned even
though they rest on inferences. Otherwise we impute to Con-
gress a futility inconsistent with the great design of this legis-
lation. This is for us the meaning of Sanitary District v.
United States . . . on this procedural point [that injunctive
relief is appropriate to maintain unobstructed navigation].'
In sum, the rationale for implied statutory authority to grant
injunctive relief is the fulfillment of the legislature's policy mandate,
while the public nuisance doctrine is grounded in protecting the public
from a substantial harm. Since the enactment of the 1899 Act, the
public nuisance doctrine has yielded to the quite different rationale of
the other doctrine in suits maintained by the federal government to
protect interstate waters from pollution. Therefore, the law as it devel-
oped following enactment of the Refuse Act was that conduct which
violated the Act could be enjoined despite the failure of Congress
expressly to provide for injunctive relief. Although injunctive relief
remained available, then, the 1899 Act altered the basis on which it
would be granted.
Despite the reduced use of the public nuisance doctrine in pro-
tecting interstate waters at the behest of the federal government, the
doctrine survived in one limited type of case. Its use continued in suits
by states invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
seeking injunctive relief against polluting activities of other states or
subdivisions thereof." It was from this line of cases that the federal
83 362 U.S. at 492. The provision of the 1899 Act from which Justice Douglas con-
cludes there is "enough federal law" to fashion additional remedies states in relevant part:
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress,
to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited;
. . • and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or
modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadsted,
harbor or refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of the
channel of any navigable water of the United States, unless the work has been
recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the
Army prior to beginning the same.
33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
84 The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction as defined both by the Constitution and
by statute includes controversies between states. The Constitution provides: "The judicial
Power shall extend . . . to Controversies between two or more States . • . ." U.S. Const.
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common law of public nuisance was unearthed and revivified in Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee. The use of the doctrine became necessary when
the offending conduct escaped the prohibitions of the 1899 Act." In
two cases, Missouri v. Illinois" and New York v. New Jersey" the
Supreme Court invoked the public nuisance doctrine, but held that the
alleged conduct would not give rise to liability under the doctrine." In
1931, however, New Jersey successfully employed the public nuisance
doctrine before the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. City of New
York," where it proved that defendant's practice of dumping garbage
at sea created a public nuisance, and obtained injunctive relief. More
recently, in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.," the State of Ohio
claimed that nonresident chemical companies' contamination of Lake
Erie created a public nuisance. 71
 The Court chose not to hear the case
as a court of original jurisdiction, recognizing its primary responsibility
as an appellate tribuna1, 72 and noting that the issues appeared to
present questions of Ohio law which could just as well be resolved in
Ohio courts. 78
The Wyandotte Chemicals decision might have had a discouraging
impact on plaintiff states seeking to proscribe polluting activities of
nonresidents. By suggesting that public nuisance is grounded in state
rather than federal law, the Supreme Court appeared to deprive
plaintiff states seeking to proscribe nonresidents' polluting activities of
art. 3, § 2. Congress has also conferred such jurisdiction on the Supreme Court: "The
Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of: (1) All controversies
between two or more States .. . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2151(a). (1970).
Similarly, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction extends to controversies between a
state and citizens of another state: "The judicial Power shall extend to Controversies .
between a State and Citizens of another State . . . and between a State ... and foreign
. Citizens or Subjects." U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2. This jurisdiction has also been further
defined by Congress: "The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive juris-
diction of . . . (3) all actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of another
State or against aliens." 28 U.S.C. 1251(b) (1970).
22
 Refuse matter "flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid
state" is excepted from the prohibitions of the Refuse Act. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
60
 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
67 256 U.S. 296 (1921).
28
 In each of these cases the plaintiff's failure to recover can be traced to adverse
factual determinations. In Missouri v. Illinois the plaintiff failed to establish that the
defendant caused the public nuisance. 200 U.S. at 526. Similarly, in New York v. New
Jersey, plaintiffs failed to prove sufficient harm to constitute a public nuisance. 256 U.S.
at 310.
69 283 U.S. 473, 481-83 (1931).
70 401 U.S. 493 (1971),
71 Id. at 494-95.
72
 Id. at 497-98, 504-05.
78 Id. at 497 n.3, 500. But see Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971),
decided less than two months prior to Wyandotte Chemicals, where the Tenth Circuit
found that a state's complaint of environmental impairment caused by nonresidents
stated a valid claim under federal common law. Without referring to public nuisance,
the Pankey court determined that the implicit public nuisance claim presented a question
of federal common law, establishing federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331(a). Id. at 242. See generally Note, 50 Texas L. Rev. 183, 185 (1971).
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both its original jurisdiction and jurisdiction of federal district courts."
As a result, such plaintiffs would have been limited to the relatively
unsatisfactory choice of proceeding in its own courts or those of the
nonresident?'
Apparently in recognition of this problem, the Supreme Court
made its declaration in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee that a federal
common law action was presented, allowing Illinois to bring its action
in federal district court under the federal question jurisdictional au-
thority of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.7° In City of Milwaukee, Illinois sought the
Supreme Court's permission to file a complaint under the Court's
original jurisdiction," claiming that defendants' untreated sewerage
discharges created a public nuisance." Noting its pressing appellate
docket demands, the Supreme Court denied permission to file the com-
plaint, but held that an interstate waterway pollution abatement suit
stated a claim under the federal common law of public nuisance. 7° The
Court thus found that the action brought by a state against a political
subdivision of another state presented a question arising under federal
law which permitted it to be heard by a federal district court. It also
found that the use of public nuisance in City of Wilwaukee would be
appropriate, noting that neither the 1899 Act nor the FWPCA supplied
the plaintiff with the remedy sought" and indicating that the use of the
74
 In a footnote, the Court stated:
In our view the federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3), providing that our
original jurisdiction in cases such as these is merely concurrent with that of
the federal district courts, reflects this same judgment [that the Supreme Court
should exercise discretion in exercising its original jurisdiction]. However, this
particular case cannot be disposed of by transferring it to an appropriate federal
district court since this statute by itself does not actually confer jurisdiction
on those courts, see C. Wright, Federal Courts 502 (2d ed. 1970), and no other
statutory jurisdictional basis exists. The fact that there is diversity of citizenship
among the parties would not support district court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 because that statute does not deal with cases in which a State is a party.
Nor would federal question jurisdiction exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. So far as
it appears from the present record, an action such as this, if otherwise cog-
nizable in a federal district court, would have to be adjudicated under state
law. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 301 U.S. 64 .. , (1938).
401 U.S. at 493 n.3.
75 Though it is possible for states to seek to protect their rights in interstate waters
from impairment by other states and citizens of other states by resorting to their own
courts or the courts of the nonresident parties, it appears that the resort to local courts
is not likely to be productive. If relief is sought in the local courts of the state suffering
from foreign pollution, problems arise regarding service of process, jurisdiction, and
out-of-state enforcement of judgment. Similarly, though conflicts doctrines and the
nationwide standards set by current environmental legislation might reduce this problem,
it is possible that if the complaining state chooses to litigate in the state of the polluter,
it may find that the polluter's conduct is lawful under quite different standards for
pollution of the polluting state. Note, 50 Texas L. Rev. 183, 184 (1971).
70 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972).
77 See note 64 supra,
78 406 U.S. at 93.
75 Id. at 93-94, 99.
80 Id. at 103.
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doctrine to provide the remedy would not be incompatible with either
enactment."
The City of Milwaukee decision was thus quite significant in that
it provided an effective means by which states may seek relief against
pollution of interstate waters, based on a theory of public nuisance.
The decision revitalized the heretofore sparingly used public nuisance
doctrine as a useful tool for the states' protection of interstate waters,
though it did so under limited circumstances: i.e., where a plaintiff
state was provided no explicit statutory remedies and where the use of
the public nuisance doctrine was consistent with the policy declaration
of the statutory scheme of remedial action directed at the mischief in
question. Thus public nuisance, which had fallen into disuse in both
federal and state suits aimed at protecting interstate waters, was re-
vived under limited circumstances by the City of Milwaukee decision.
The district court in Bushey relied on the Supreme Court's pro-
nouncement on the continued viability of the public nuisance concept
set forth in the City of Milwaukee decision." Moreover, it extended
City of Milwaukee by interpreting' the case as establishing an inde-
pendent source of federal law available to the federal government as
well as state governments to protect interstate waters." Thus when
defendants moved for dismissal, claiming that the 1899 Act did not
explicitly provide for the relief sought and that such relief could not be
"implied" from the Act," the court determined that the action could
still be maintained on independent public nuisance grounds."
The Bushey court's decision can arguably be supported in terms
of public nuisance precedent. First, it can be maintained that the com-
plaint states allegations which, if proven true, constitute a public
nuisance. Repeated spills of substantial amounts of oil into a public
harbor may be considered an interference with navigation, or an inter-
ference with public property," or a possible interference with public
health by polluting drinking and bathing waters."
81 The Court explicitly stated that use of public nuisance was not inconsistent with
the FWPCA. Id. at 104. At the same time, the Court implied that the use of public
nuisance was not inconsistent with the 1899 Act. After taking cognizance of the relation-
ship between the 1899 Act and the FWPCA, id. at 101, the Court stated:
It may happen that new federal laws and new federal regulations may in
time pre-empt the field of federal common law of nuisance. But until that
comes to pass, federal courts will be empowered to appraise the equities of the
suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollution.
Id. at 107. Thus the court explicitly recognizes the compatibility of all existing legislation
with the use of the public nuisance doctrine.
82 See 346 F. Supp. at 149.
88 See id. at 149-50.
84 See note 9 supra.
88 346 F. Supp. at 148-49. See notes 13-17, 21 supra.
80 The interstate waters of Lake Champlain can be viewed as public property held
in "public trust" by the government. For a discussion of the public trust doctrine, see
Comment, 13 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 782, 791-93 (1972).
81 Lake Champlain is used for bathing, fishing, and other recreational uses, as well
as for agricultural, industrial, and water supply purposes. 346 F. Supp. at 150 n.10.
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Further, it could be argued that the use of the public nuisance
doctrine is appropriate despite the existence of specific legislation deal-
ing with the activities alleged to constitute a public nuisance. Even
without relying on the City of Milwaukee case, as did the Bushey
court, for the proposition that the use of the public nuisance doctrine
is appropriate despite the enactment of the 1899 Act and the FWPCA,
the use of the public nuisance doctrine arguably would be appropriate.
Following the Debs rationale," the continued spilling of oil into Lake
Champlain might be considered to cause great public harm, creating
such injury as to justify enjoining conduct despite criminal penalties
under the 1899 Act.
Similarly, the proposition that the use of public nuisance is ap-
propriate despite the remedial provisions of the FWPCA" can be
supported on the ground that the relief sought is consistent with the
underlying policy of the statute and that therefore the common law was
not impliedly repealed by enactment of the statute. 9° The policy dec-
larations of sections 1151 (a) 91
 and 1161(b) (1) 92 of the FWPCA
arguably support the contention that the public nuisance doctrine is
consistent with the policies of the FWPCA of discouraging water
pollution in general and pollution by oil in particular.
Thus Bushey's use of the public nuisance doctrine can arguably
be supported. The conduct alleged is within the bounds of conduct
which in the past has been found to constitute a public nuisance. The
use of the doctrine can be argued to be appropriate, even absent the
rationale which the Bushey court applied—i.e., that Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee established an extra-statutory cause of action available to
the federal government as well as to the states in pollution abatement_
cases. In terms of the traditional problems associated with the use of
public nuisance, Bushey's result can be supported on two grounds:
first, that the harm threatened the public justifies the use of the public
nuisance doctrine under the Debs rationale despite the criminal sanc-
tions of the 1899 Act; second, that the federal common law of public
nuisance is compatible with the policies of the water pollution remedial
legislation, the FWPCA, and, accordingly, retains its vitality.
It is submitted, however, that in light of the relief provided by the
FWPCA, Bushey erroneously extended the holding of Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee. It is further submitted that the policy embodied in the
88 See text at notes 35-42 supra.
89 33 U.S.C. § 1161(e) (1970). See note 21 supra for the text of this section.
99 See text at note 45 supra.
01 33 U.S.C.
	
1151(a) (1970). This section provides that "[Me purpose of this
chapter is to enhance the quality and value of our water resources and to establish a
national policy for the prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution."
92 33 'U.S.C. § 1161(b) (1) (1970). This section provides that "[tjhe Congress hereby
declares that it is the policy of the United States that there should be no discharges
of oil into or upon the navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or
into or upon the waters of the contiguous zone."
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FWPCA is inconsistent with the holding that the public nuisance
doctrine retains its vitality despite the existence of that statute.
It appears that Bushey applied City of Milwaukee too broadly.
Bushey cited City of Milwaukee for the proposition that public nui-
sance retains its vitality as a means of recovery despite the enactments
of the 1899 Act and the FWPCA. However, City of Milwaukee's
holding is not so broad. If City of Milwaukee is limited to its facts, it
requires the narrower proposition that neither the 1899 Act nor the
FWPCA precludes the use of public nuisance by plaintif  states to
obtain injunctive relief against nonresident polluters, where the enact-
ments fail to provide the plaintiff a means of obtaining relief.93 Given
its factual situation, Bushey expands City of Milwaukee to permit the
continued use of public nuisance by the federal government as plaintiff,
despite the enactment of the 1899 Act and the FWPCA, even though
section 1161(e) of the FWPCA provides the federal government a
means of obtaining relief. Thus, Bushey can be criticized for applying
the City of Milwaukee determination that the use of public nuisance is
appropriate, without appreciating the differences between the facts of
the two cases.
It has been noted that even without the authority of City of Mil-
waukee an argument might be made that Bushey's use of public nui-
sance was appropriate, despite the enactment of the remedial provisions
of the FWPCA, because Bushey's use of the doctrine is compatible with
the policy declarations of the FWPCA." It is submitted that this argu-
ment is without merit, since the suggestion of the court in Bushey that
the federal government's use of public nuisance is appropriate despite
the existence of explicit remedies would defeat the intent of Congress in
promulgating the FWPCA. An examination of the applicable legislation
and its legislative history suggests that it seeks to limit the circum-
stances under which the federal government may seek injunctive relief
for potential oil spills and that implications of the Bushey decision cir-
cumvent this design. The provision, section 1161(e), states in relevant
part:
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local gov-
ernment, when the President determines there is an imminent
and substantial threat to the public health or welfare of the
United States, .. . the President may require the United
States attorney of the district in which the threat occurs to
secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such threat,
and the district courts of the United States shall have juris-
diction to grant such relief as the public interest and the
equities of the case may require."
95 See text at note 80 supra.
94 See text at notes 89-92 supra.
95 33 U.S.C. I 1161(e) (1970).
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When the FWPCA was first enacted in 1948,98 it contained a statement
of policy:
[I]n connection with the exercise of jurisdiction over the
waterways of the Nation and in consequence of the benefits
resulting to the public health and welfare by the abatement
of stream pollution, it is hereby declared to be the policy of
Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary re-
sponsibilities and rights of the states in preventing and con-
trolling water pollution . . . 
. 97
The import of this policy statement, that the obligation of primary
pollution enforcement is placed on the states, is further substantiated
by comments of Senators Barkley and Taft, the co-sponsors of the bill,
which clearly emphasized that the states were to be primarily respon-
sible for the Act's enforcement.98
When the bill was amended in 1956, the design of Senators Bark-
ley and Taft was retained. The "primary responsibility of the states"
clause was again written into the legislation, ° and the enforcement
measures provided by the 1956 Amendments precluded the federal
government from bringing suit against polluters without the consent of
state authorities."' Most significantly, when section 1161(e) was
enacted in 1970 it was intended to be consistent with the general policy
of the FWPCA. The Committee Report that discussed section 1161(e)
explained the intent of the legislators in enacting that section:
The President is authorized to seek an injunction against
any actual or threatened discharge from an onshore or off-
shore drilling production facility or an onshore or offshore
facility. Again the committee expects that this authority will
be used only in those instances where a State or local police
action has failed and where the owner or operator is either
unable or unwilling to control the actual or threatened dis-
charge."'
96 Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155.
97 Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758,	 1, 62 Stat. 1155.
08 Co-sponsor Senator Alben Barkley commented:
[l]n this bill, while we recognize that Federal obligation [to control navi-
gable streams and protect against obstructions to navigation), we undertake to
place the responsibility upon the local communities . . . .
[W]e have all through this legislation sought to put the responsibility on
local authorities. We have not undertaken to take away from local authorities
their initial responsibility.
Hearings on S. 418 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 339-41 (1947). The other sponsor, Senator Robert Taft, stated that
"[t]he general theory has been that pollution control would be effected by the States
through their own laws and through their own controls." Id. at 17.
99 Act of July 9, 1956, ch. 518, § 1, 70 Stat. 498.
100 Act of July 9, 1956, ch. 518, § 8(f), 70 Stat. 498, 505.
101 Senate Comm. on Public Works, Amending the Federal Water Pollution Control
782
CASE NOTES
It is readily apparent that the grant of authority in section 1161(e)
was meant to be limited. Consistent with the policy declarations of the
Act generally, federal enforcement action was designed to supplement
where necessary, but not displace, state enforcement action.'" Indeed,
it can reasonably be submitted that the drafters of the legislation con-
sidered the possibility of federal enforcement undesirable except in
extraordinary cases.
The suggestion of the Bushey decision appears incompatible with
this policy. By referring to the public nuisance doctrine and suggesting
that the federal government is not bound by the enforcement limitations
of the FWI'CA, Bushey provides a means for allowing federal enforce-
ment actions where the threat is less than the "imminent and substan-
tial" requirement of section 1161(e). According to Bushey, in a public
nuisance action, a plaintiff need only show that the defendant's conduct
is unreasonable and likely to occur, in order to obtain injunctive re-
lief.' By suggesting a means by W"	 which the plaintiff Government can
avoid the "imminent and substantial" threat prerequisite, Bushey en-
ables the Government to act in any situation where interstate waters
are threatened with degradation. This result defeats the design of
Congress, in that Congress sought to limit federal action to only that
pollution which was "imminent and substantial," assuring that states
would remain the primary enforcers of antipollution measures.
Thus, the rationale of Bushey can be used to circumvent specific
legislative regulatory schemes. Just as Bushey's use of public nuisance
provides a means by which the federal government can bring suit
against polluters without meeting the "imminent and substantial"
threat standard of section 1161(e), future courts dealing with other
problems may rely on Bushey's suggestion that the public nuisance
doctrine remains viable despite explicit statutory provisions which
suggest otherwise. Such circumvention of legislative intent would
create serious separation of powers problems. The implication of
Bushey would free the executive branch from the constraints of the
water pollution legislation, and concomitantly liberate federal courts
from the clear—if not expressly stated—jurisdictional limitation of
Act, As Amended, And For Other Purposes, S. Doc. No. 351, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19
(emphasis added).
102 This statutory scheme is continued in the 1972 Amendments. Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 101(b), 311(e)
(codified at 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(b), 1321(e) (Supp. 1973)).
As this note went to press, another court held, in accordance with the Bushey deci-
sion, that the federal government could maintain a public nuisance action despite the
remedial provisions supplied in the FWPCA. United States v. United States Steel Corp.,
— F. Supp. 5 E.R.C. 1125 (N.D. 111. 1973). The U.S. Steel decision is particularly
interesting in that it concluded that the 1972 Amendments, note 17 supra, do not preclude
the federal government's bringing a public nuisance action. However, U.S. Steel involved
a complaint of waste water discharge, and accordingly the remedy provided by § 1161(e)
did not apply as it did in Bushey, which involved water polluted by an oil spill. Hence
the U.S. Steel case does not run afoul of the congressional intent expressed in § 1161(e).
203 See 346 F. Supp. at 150.
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section 1161(e). This would result in a reduction of the effectiveness
of congressional legislative schemes. The executive branch, by prose-
cuting, and the judiciary, by deciding, cases on the extra-statutory au-
thority of the public nuisance doctrine despite the legislature's implicit
denial of authority in section 1161(e), would, in effect, be encroaching
on the congressional sphere of power. They would be providing for
federal enforcement action where Congress did not. In this sense it
can be said that the Bushey decision carries the undesirable implication
of disturbing the constitutional separation of powers.
It is submitted, then, that the extra-statutory remedy of a public
nuisance action by the federal government is inconsistent with the clear
limitation on injunctive relief contained in section 1161(e) of the
FWPCA. There is no way that the Bushey decision can be reconciled
with section 1161(e). There appears to be no way that Bushey can
use the public nuisance doctrine as a basis for the Government's
suit without circumventing the legislative scheme underlying the
FWPCA and violating the separation of powers doctrine. For these
reasons, it is submitted that Bushey should have been decided on nar-
rower grounds.
The public nuisance doctrine should not have been used as the
basis for denying the motion to dismiss. Rather, consideration of
the federal government's authority to proceed should have been con-
cerned with section 1161(e). If the court found the threat posed by
defendants Bushey and Northern Oil to be "imminent and substantial,"
the motion to dismiss should have been denied. On the other hand, if
defendants' conduct was not found to pose an "imminent and sub-
stantial" threat, the motion to dismiss should have been granted, based
on the finding that the section 1161 (e) prerequisites to federal action
had not been met. By deciding Bushey in light of the above considera-
tions, the court could have given full effect to the environmental pro-
tection design of Congress in the FWPCA.
In conclusion, though the conduct alleged in the complaint falls
within the purview of public nuisance, and Illinois v. City of Mil-
waukee suggests that the use of public nuisance is not precluded by
federal water pollution legislation, the Bushey court's use of the public
nuisance doctrine is incorrectly based on an overly broad reading of
City of Milwaukee. It creates a means by which a congressional design
for water pollution control, evidenced in section 1161(e) of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, is circumvented and congressional policy
is unfulfilled. City of Milwaukee should be read more narrowly to allow
public nuisance actions only when such actions are consistent with
congressional policy, as, for example, where the FWPCA provides that
state and interstate enforcement action is to be encouraged and does
not provide states with explicit statutory remedies. The motion to dis-
miss in Bushey should have been decided on the basis of section
1161(e) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. In such a manner,
the facts of the Bushey case could be put to the "imminent and sub-
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stantial threat" test, and federal action would necessarily be made con-
tingent on the inadequacy of state action, in harmony with the design
of Congress.
GARY H. BARNES
Labor Law—National Labor Relations Act—Section S(b) (1) (B)
—Union Discipline of Supervisory Employees for Strikebreaking
Activities—IBEW v. NLRB (M. Bell Tel. Co.) 1—The members
of Local 134, IBEW, initiated an economic strike against their em-
ployer, the Illinois Bell Telephone Company. 2 In an effort to combat the
effects of this strike, Bell strongly encouraged its foremen and super-
visory employees to remain at work during the strike .° However,
because of a contractual union security provision that required super-
visory employees to be union members, Bell felt that any decision to
work or to respect the strike should be left to the personal discretion of
the foremen.4
 Although Bell did not discipline those supervisors who
respected the strike, the company nevertheless left no doubt as to its
real wishes .° In an attempt to thwart any strikebreaking on the part
of the foremen, the union, prior to the strike, informed them that they
would be subject to union disciplinary action if they performed rank-
and-file work during the work stoppage.' In spite of the union's ad-
monitions, several supervisors reported to perform rank-and-file work
during the strike.7
 In conformance with its pre-strike warning, the
union initiated disciplinary proceedings against those supervisor-
members who threatened the union's economic solidarity by engaging
in rank-and-file work.° Several fines, ranging from $500 to $1000, were
imposed; the extent of each fine was determined by the degree of in-
volvement in the strikebreaking activity.°
The Bell Supervisors' Protective Association, which had been
formed by the foremen to protect the rights of those who chose to work
during the strike, filed unfair labor practice charges with the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in response to the union's disciplinary
measures." The Association allegedll that the imposition of the fines
constituted a violation of section 8(b) (1) (B) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), which provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair
1
 — F.2d —, 81. L.R.R.M. 2257 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2 Id. at 2258.
a Id.
4 Id.
6 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9
 Id. at 2259.
10
 IBEW (Ill. Bell Tel. Co.), 192 N.L.R.B. No. 17, 77 L.R.R.M. 1610 (1971).
11 77 L.R.R.M. at 1611.
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